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A Woman Decides: Justice O'Connor and Due Process
Rights of Choice*
Peggy Cooper Davis** and Carol Gilligan***
We have been asked to address Justice O'Connor's reproductive rights
jurisprudence. Of course, the mention of Justice O'Connor in a sentence with
reproductive rights calls to mind a familiar narrative: a story of opposition to-and
vindication of-Roe v. Wade's' central holding. Its subject is the constitutional
principle that state regulation of a woman's decision whether to continue or abort
a pregnancy must be measured in ways that reflect the fundamental importance, in
our constitutional scheme, of uncoerced decision making about such life-defining
2
matters as marriage, procreation, parenting, and the manner of one's death. Its hero
is Justice O'Connor. The story's basic plot is as follows: a president opposed in
principle to the termination of pregnancies by abortion appointed Justice O'Connor
to the Supreme Court bench in the hope that she would supply a vote crucial to
overturning Roe and returning to states the authority to prohibit and criminalize
abortion. In decisions spanning her first ten years on the Supreme Court bench, the
Justice developed an influential critique of the reasoning of Roe. In 1992, however,
she joined fellow centrists on the Court to reaffirm Roe's central holding and to
reaffirm as well the broader constitutional right to a significant measure of freedom
from state coercion in making basic and intensely personal life choices. As the
centrist Justices stated:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. Our cases recognize "the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child." Our precedents "have respected the private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter." These matters, involving the most intimate
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
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of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.3
In these words, the Justices embraced what Cooper Davis has described as a national
commitment, codified in the Reconstruction Amendments, to a definition of
citizenship that includes human rights of self-determination, moral autonomy, and
full civic participation.4
True, the centrist Justices weakened protection of the right to choose abortion,
adopting an undue burden analysis in lieu of Roe's trimester analysis. 5 The undue
burden test, which was applied by a majority of the Court in 2000,6 permits an as yet
indeterminate constriction of rights of abortion choice, particularly in the first
trimester. Still, affirmation of Roe's central holding preserved an important liberty
for women and strengthened the Court's commitment to meaningful protection of
the range of liberty interests ranked as fundamental guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
We do not propose to defend or correct the popular story of Justice O'Connor
as a hero who saved Roe's central holding by judiciously narrowing it. 7 Our project
is to interrogate a significant gap in the story-to ask why Justice O'Connor's ten
year critique of Roe led to reaffirmation of its central holding rather than to its
repudiation. We argue that the Justice's respect for individual choice in matters that
define one's personhood is related to anadmirable capacity to appreciate equally the
role of principles or first premises and the role of context in legal decisionmaking.
We also argue, perhaps controversially, that the capacity to integrate premise-based
and contextual analysis is a strength that must be developed against the grain of
cultural and psycho-social pressures that are grounded in theories and stereotypes
about gender but inhibit intellectual versatility in both men and women.8 In arguing
our second point, we take care not to run afoul of Justice O'Connor's sound advice
that critiques involving gender difference harm women if they reinforce disabling

3.
4.

Id. at 851 (citations omitted).

PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 226-41
(1997).
5.
/d. at 212.
6.
See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921-22 (2000) (considering the constitutionality of a criminal
prohibition of abortion by certain procedures).
7.
We recognize, of course, that in reaffirming the central holding of Roe, the Court accepted limitations
on the right of choice that had previously been struck on Roe's authority. We also recognize that Justice O'Connor
embraced, and in many respects cut, the doctrinal path for approving these new limitations. A focus on the
limitations has led some to tell the story that culminates in Casey's reaffirmation as a story of abortion opponents'
success. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Schneider, Workability of the Undue Burden Test, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1003, 1027
(1993) (emphasizing that the Casey court "severely weakened... [the right of abortion choice] by giving states
greater latitude to regulate abortion during the first and second trimester of a woman's pregnancy"). We believe the
story of reaffirmation is important and expect that it will be more enduring.
8.
We do not argue, as others have, that women are contextual thinkers and men are abstract thinkers. See
Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication,72 VA. L. REV. 543, 587-89
(1986). We argue, rather, that integration of contextual analysis into reasoning about matters in public and
professional spheres is inhibited by a mix of psychological and cultural forces.
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gender-based stereotypes. 9 Here is a map of what follows: In section I, we explain
what we do-and do not-intend when we say that gender can be relevant to the
development of strength in judicial decisionmaking. In Part II, we explain how
reliance on gender stereotypes, and a concomitant disregard of complexity, can
distort and impoverish legal reasoning. In Part III, we show how Justice O'Connor
has avoided gender stereotypes, faced complexity, and mined context, in her
analyses of the meaning and scope of due process liberty. We conclude Part III by
arguing for even greater vigilance lest due process liberty be inappropriately
circumscribed in the reproductive rights context.
I. WHAT WE MEAN BY DIFFERENT VOICES

The preceding road map suggests an irony in our argument. Parts II and III seem
to be premised in part on the idea that to resort to gender stereotypes is a bad thing,
yet we promise to advance the overarching proposition that Justice O'Connor's
reproductive rights jurisprudence has revealed strengths that have to do with gender.
Are we falling prey to the vice we condemn? Are we suggesting that Justice
O'Connor is a stereotypical woman deciding constitutional questions in Gilligan's
"different voice" of relationship and care?' Of course we are not. Our
argument-like Gilligan's underlying work-is -both more complex and more
defensible. We argue that Justice O'Connor-like many capable women, and like
many capable men-has the intellectual courage and versatility to reason from
principles without losing sight of the difficult facts which principles compete and
that different situations shed different light on a principle's meaning and proper
scope. Development of these qualities requires some level of conscious or
unconscious resistance to suppressing, in professional and other "public" spheres,
the relational, inductive, and particularizing aspects of reasoned problem solving.
To develop this argument properly, we must review aspects of Gilligan's account
of male and female psycho-social development and its implications for assessing
modes of reasoning.
In retrospect, we suspect that the title of Gilligan's In a Different Voice has
caused a confusing oversimplification of Gilligan's basic ideas. The sound-bite
summary of Gilligan's work is that it purports to show that women reason in a
"different" voice of relationship and care. To imagine only that women reason in a
different voice is to focus on the middle of a complex developmental and cultural
story that begins, in infancy, with deeply relational human beings of both sexes.

See Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia'sProgress,66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1546, 1553 (1991) (arguing that the
9.
"New Feminism" is "troubling... because it so nearly echoes the Victorian myth of the 'True Woman' that kept
women out of law for so long").
10. CAROL GILLIGAN, INA DIFFERENT VOICE 1-2 (2d ed. 1993).
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Gilligan observed, as did Chodorow," that in circumstances and cultures in which
women are the primary care-givers for children, the relational intensity of the
parent-child bond is (or is made to seem) in tension with the emerging sexual
identity of male, but not of female toddlers.12 In ongoing research, Gilligan charts
male toddlers' more emphatic individuation, providing new evidence of
developmental responses to the expectation, in a world of predominantly female
infant caregiving, that "masculinity is defined through separation while feminity is
defined through attachment."' 3 Because this tension does not exist (or is not
culturally encouraged) for female toddlers, they are better able to embrace
relationship and less motivated to maintain a stance of sharp individuation.
Discussions of Gilligan's work are too often preoccupied with her insights
concerning the differences that emerge in the toddler phase-with the idea that girls
tend to be more comfortable than boys in valuing relationship and reasoning
according to a relational logic. But Gilligan's observations concerning the toddler
phase mark only the beginning of the developmental and cultural lessons of her
work. Gilligan's tragic, and in many ways most consequential, observation is that,
over the course of childhood, comfort in relationships is compromised, and
relational intelligence is inhibited, for both boys and girls. The comfort in
relationship that is compromised for boys at the toddler phase is compromised for
girls during the second individuation that accompanies adolescence. As girls seek
their identity at the edge of adulthood, they find relationship and relational reasoning
valued only in domestic and other presumptively nurturing contexts. Their cultures
are apt to value relational approaches in domains like mothering, teaching, or
nursing, but to deny or disparage them in equally relational, but largely maledominated domains like business, law, medicine, or politics. In better compensated
and higher status pursuits, relational reasoning seems to be eschewed as firmly as
it is in the socialization of male toddlers, such that in these domains inductive,
contextual, and psychological analyses are suspect while deductive, rule-based, and
4
nonsubjective analyses are valorized.'
Because suppression of the relational comes later for girls, and because
relational reasoning is affirmed in the domestic and other nurturing domains within
which girls receive far more cultural approval than boys do, girls seem to eschew
relational logic less completely. But they suppress it nonetheless. Girls seem always
to retain, at some level, a lingering confidence in the importance of relationship and
the power of relational logics. Girls are also able, in domestic and other "nurturing"
contexts, to value relationship without encountering cultural disapproval.

11.

NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY
OF

GENDER 150, 166-67 (1978).
12.

GILLIGAN, supra note 10, at 7-8.

13. Id. at 8.
14. See Workways, at http://www.law.nyu.edu/workways (describing how this pattern of disparagement
manifests itself in law).
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Nonetheless, in political, market, and broader social contexts, girls tend increasingly
in the adolescent years to yield to the culturally dominant view that relational
represents powerlessness, wishy-washy-ness, and an absence of reason.
To a greater or lesser extent, then, we all suffer the loss of Gilligan's different,
relational voice. This suppression of relational values leaves a person in a state of
dissociation-a two-mindedness in which one feels compelled to operate in terms
of an incomplete set of relevant principles. To the extent that women are more
conscious of suppressed relational values, we are likely to have a greater sense of
a need to inhibit social or political assertion of our thoughts, desires, and judgments
and defer to the thoughts, desires, and judgments of others. For us, the different,
relational voice is more often understood as a suppressed voice of the self. But
relational values are available to all; the capacity for intersubjectivity is one of
humankind's greatest gifts. Few would deny that problems are better solved with an
array of intellectual tools that includes relational-as well as other forms ofreasoning. 15 Dissociation must occur for men and women alike, and it must diminish
us all.
We have said that women tend to be aware, in the process of dissociation, of a
need to suppress a voice, or set of reasoning styles, that we associate with our selves,
or personhood. We have also said that, as a general matter, relational modes are
culturally devalued while apparently contrasting modes are culturally privileged. We
believe that these two factors exert a subordinating effect, such that adolescent girls
go beyond suppressing relational modes to adopting stances of self-effacement and
selflessness. This observation is at the heart of both the greatest misconception about
Gilligan's work and the greatest loss of women's dissociation: whereas Gilligan is
commonly perceived as a thinker who seeks to valorize selflessness and selfsacrifice, her starkest finding is that girls tend to take on in adolescence, and too
often fail to overcome in adulthood, patterns of deference and self-sacrifice that are
frankly pathological. Selflessness is not a mode of reasoning through problems; its
only logic is simple deference. Problems are not satisfactorily resolved by a denial
of the needs and interests of the self. Gilligan's prescription is not that women
valorize selflessness. Denial of self-interest is inappropriate and self-destructive.
This is especially true when one is reasoning in terms of relationship, whether in
16
is not a central function.
caregiving domains or in domains in which caregiving
Gilligan' s prescription is that we integrate relational and other modes of reasoning

15. We emphasize that we do not seek the suppression of modes of reasoning other than the relational. To
note the subordination of relational values and reasoning is not to wish for the subordination of generalization or
deductive reasoning. It is, rather, to encourage conceptual versatility in efforts to resolve law's-and
life's-problems.
16. See Peggy Cooper Davis, A Reflection on Three Verbs: To Father,To Mother, To Parent,in MOTHER
TROUBLES: RETHINKING CONTEMPORARY MATERNAL DILEMMAS 250,269-74 (Julia E. Hanigsberg & Sara Ruddick,

eds., 1999) (arguing that nurturing an emotionally healthy child requires engaging the child in the management of
both the child's and the caregivers' needs rather than offering selfless devotion).
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and find the confidence, in all areas of human endeavor, to exercise judgment
instead of yielding to tendencies to defer.
As Gilligan's prescription to women suggests, dissociation is not without
remedy. Both women and men are capable of looking behind social
stereotypes-and working through conflicts associated with psycho-social
development-so that they are able to embrace a full range of reasoning styles. For
men, this may require coming to terms with deep-seated associations between
relational thinking and loss of identity. For women, it may require overcoming a
deeply ingrained fear that genuine political and social assertiveness will lead to our
rejection and isolation. But for both it is possible to develop the capacity to alternate
comfortably between deductive and inductive, contextual and generalizing, and
relational and rule-based reasoning modes.
How will these ideas inform our analysis of Justice O'Connor's reproductive
rights jurisprudence? We will use them in two senses: first, to make a very narrow
point about one of the many factors contributing to the wisdom of the Justice's
jurisprudence, and second, to make a somewhat broader point about the difficulty
of safeguarding a right of autonomous decision making in a context in which the
decision-makers are necessarily female. The narrower point is that Justice
O'Connor's intellectual versatility suggests a capacity to overcome dissociation and
use a full range of reasoning and problem solving modes. The broader point is that
Justice O'Connor has helped-and should continue to help-the Supreme Court to
overcome the conceptual difficulty of giving appropriate recognition to women's
right to make procreative choices in a world in which: a) women are not
stereotypically thought of as agents and decision makers; b) modes of reasoning that
are stereotypically associated with women are culturally devalued; and c) both
women and men fail to fully appreciate the intellectually complex reasoning that is
required of a woman experiencing an unplanned, poorly-planned, or dangerous
pregnancy or carrying a child with diagnosed disabilities.
II. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN JUDGES HEAR STEREOTYPICAL VOICES

Professor Lea VanderVelde is responsible for an illuminating and pioneering
study of the effects stereotyped thinking can have in the interpretation and evolution
of legal doctrine.' 7 On the basis of painstaking research of an important body of
English and American common law contract cases, she established a relationship
between a gendered perception of employees and an important change in American
contract law. 18 The law in question was the "Lumley rule"-named for the English
case involving opera singer Johanna Wagner.' 9 The Lumley rule provides that in

17. Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley Doctrine: Binding Mens Consciencesand
Women's Fidelity, 101 YALE L.J. 775, 784-99 (1992).
18. Id. at 776-83.
19. Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 693 (Ch. 1852).
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appropriate circumstances courts may enforce employment contracts by enjoining
2°
the employee from serving a competitor of the employer. When first announced
in the British court system, this doctrine was contrary to prevailing American law
and unpersuasive to American jurists. 2' American free labor ideology had led courts
to respect each employee as "the master of his fate." Placing an employee under
restraints against working for a competitor of a former employer seemed
inconsistent with that ideology. Nevertheless, by the end of the nineteenth century,
courts in the United States overcame their initial resistance and embraced Lumley.
VanderVelde's research shows that the eventual acceptance of Lumley by
American courts was facilitated by the gendered context in which the reported cases
were decided.22 When courts faced a string of cases in which the employee was a
woman, the "master of his fate" imagery failed to manifest, and free labor ideology
lost its force. As VanderVelde reports,
all of the prominent cases in . . . [the] line [establishing acceptance of

Lumley] involved the services of women[,] and only women performers
were subjected to permanent injunctions against performing elsewhere for
the duration of the contract. In the corpus of reported cases, no male
quitting and performing
performer was ever permanently enjoined from
23
century.
nineteenth
entire
the
elsewhere during
Having established that the Lumley rule was assimilated in contexts involving only
female employees, VanderVelde offers the following explanations for the
acceptance of Lumley by American courts:
Nineteenth-century women performers were less likely [than males in any
occupation] to be viewed as free and independent employees. Nineteenth
century women were generally perceived as relationally bound to men. In
this line of cases, that perception of women manifested itself in the need to
bind actresses to their male theater managers ....

[I]n the view of the

likely to be perceived as
dominant culture, women performers were more
24
counterparts.
male
their
were
subordinate than
VanderVelde concludes that a restricted "conceptualization of women in the
25
rule in America.,
nineteenth century paved the way for adoption of the Lumley

20. Id. at 693.
21. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley Doctrine, supra note 17, at 795-99 (1992).
22. Id. at 777-78.
23. Id. at 776-77.
24. Id. at 778-79.
25. Id. at 779.
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This conclusion is supported by Cooper Davis's detailed analysis of narrative and
metaphor in the Lumely line of cases.26

The Lumley analysis suggests that restricted conceptualizations of women
influence jurists' interpretations of legal norms governing the economic sphere. We
believe that restricted conceptualizations of women are likely to have an even
greater effect on judges' interpretations of rights associated with personal and
domestic matters. Reproductive rights cases, the ultimate subject of our inquiry,
force a rare melding of the personal and the political: they require that discourses of
law and politics be applied to decisionmaking about sexuality, partnering, parenting,
and domestic governance. Cases involving rights of autonomy in choosing the
manner of one's death-so-called "right-to-die" cases-seem more universal and
less gendered, but they too require that courts address intensely personal matters in
the discourses of law and politics. These cases therefore can yield significant
insights about how judges conceptualize men and women in throes of intensely
personal decisionmaking. Steven Miles and Allison August have conducted an
analysis of right-to-die cases that suggests that the right of bodily-integrity and the
freedom to choose death over life with a profound disability are, like the right to
work as one chooses, more difficult to imagine when claimed by a woman. 21 Miles
and August examined all appellate level state cases in which courts considered an
application to forego life-sustaining treatment. 28 Their statistical account of the
outcomes of these cases was striking. In the category of previously competent
persons without living wills or other advance directives, Miles and August found,
for example, that in seventy-five percent of cases involving men, but in only
fourteen percent of cases involving women, courts "constructed the patient's own
preference for medical care from the memories and insights of family and friends. 29
In each case, the constructed preference supported the termination of life-supporting
treatment. This statistical evidence is buttressed by Miles and August's careful
analysis of the patterns of stereotyped thinking reflected in the judicial opinions.
Courts, according to Miles and August, described the opinions of men as "rational"
and the similar opinions of women as "unreflective. 30 Courts recognized the "moral
agency" of men, but not of women. 3' They applied higher standards of proof (like
the clear and convincing standard applied by the state of Missouri with respect to
Nancy Beth Cruzan 32 ) in evaluating the previously expressed preferences of

26. See Peggy Cooper Davis, The Proverbial Woman, 48 THE RECORD (of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City
of New York) Jan./Feb. 1993 at 7, 12-15 (supporting VanderVelde's interpretation of the Lumley line of cases).
27. Steven H. Miles and Allison August, Courts, Genderand "The Right to Die" 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 85 (1990).
28. Id. at 93 n.3.
29. Id. at 86.
30. Id. at 87.
31. Id.
32. Cruzan v. Missouri, 497 U.S. 261, 284 (1990).
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women. 33 In constructing narrative accounts of the patients' situations, Miles and
August assert that courts described "life-support dependent men as subjected to34
medical assault ... [while] women were seen as vulnerable to medical neglect.
Women, and only women, were described in child-like terms-as in "fetal
postures," in an "infantile state," or in need of "parens patriae" protection.35 On the
other hand, in contrast to these metaphors of infancy and childhood, we find in cases
involving men an insistence that the patient be treated as an adult. Thus, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court argued in a case involving a male patient that it was
necessary to move "away from a paternalistic view of what is 'best' for a patient
toward a reaffirmation [of] .

.

. what decision will comport with the will of the

patient. ,,36
Based on the VanderVelde and the Miles and August studies, a conclusion that
a jurist's sense of the scope or weight of a liberty interest can be influenced by a
gendered conception of the interest-bearing subject seems fair. In the Lumley line
of cases, a spate of specific performance questions involving women in the
performing arts seems to have influenced judges' sense of the reach and importance
of common law notions of liberty and agency in the employment market. In right-todie cases, it seems that it was more difficult for judges to give voice to women's
previously expressed wishes or to imagine women deciding, or wishing to decide,
the conditions of their survival. On the other hand, it may have been more difficult
for judges to imagine men under the sway of depression or of caregivers motivated
to reduce costs or end their own discomfort. These conceptual and interpretive
differences may cause judges to unreasonably compromise women's right to choose
the manner of their deaths: when evidence of a wish to end life-prolonging measures
is discredited, paternalistic concern-often buttressed by a state's unqualified
commitment to the preservation of life-will constrain too much the right to choose
the manner of one's death. These same conceptual and interpretive differences may
cause judges to guard too jealously the liberty interests of men: when evidence of
a resolution to end life gracefully is too easily credited, libertarian concern may
cause a court to give too little weight to the possibility of coercion, depression,
change of heart or to a state's legitimate interest in the preservation of life.
Attentive readers will have anticipated that we see connections between the
effects gender can have on elaboration of a right to work or a right to choose the
manner of one's death and elaboration of a right to decide whether to continue a
pregnancy. Of course, what one thinks of the right to choose abortion must be
affected by the fact that a potential life turns on the choice. What one thinks about

33.
34.

Miles and August, supra note 27, at 87.

id.
35. See id. at 88 (citing In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,655(1976); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1217 (1985);
Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 679 (1986); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 740 (1983); In re Longeway, 549
N.E.2d 292, 301 (1989)).
36. Id. (quoting Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986)).
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choosing abortion therefore will depend enormously, and inevitably, on what one
thinks about when fetal life begins and whether termination of a pregnancy is
categorically wrong. But the central question for Supreme Courtjudges has not been
whether deciding to have an abortion is categorically wrong, the question has been:
who, as between a woman and the state, should make the decision?37 The studies
described above suggest that gender affects judges' sense of the importance of an
individual's right to make life-defining decisions. Legal interpretations having to do
with the reach and weight of a right of choice can be affected by the way the
circumstances of choice are imagined as well as by how the person-or class of
persons-facing the choice is conceptualized. The right to choose a professional
affiliation and the right to choose the manner of one's death seemed to win less
recognition when they were claimed by women, and this lack of recognition seemed
attributable to stereotypes according to which women lack agency and
decisionmaking competence. The right to choose whether and when to bear a child
can only be held by a woman, for only a woman has the capacity to bear a child.
There is reason, then, to fear that recognition of this right of choice will be less
easily recognized than it would be if it were (or could be) claimed by men.
But there is more. The theories advanced in Part I suggest that recognition of the
right to choose childbearing will be compromised for reasons that go beyond the
stereotypical view of women as lacking agency and the capacity for competent
decisionmaking. According to these theories, women are both culturally expected
to be and psychologically at risk for being excessively self-sacrificing and
deferential. If this is so, then recognition of a right to choose-or to
reject-childbearing will have a greater cultural and psychological resonance than
recognition of a right to work or a right to choose the manner of one's death. It will
be perceived by the culture as a whole-and felt by pregnant women-as a
disavowal of women's obligations of self-sacrifice to the caregiving function and
deference to external norms. Indeed, although work outside the domestic sphere is
perceived by some as inconsistent with women's proper role, and although a
decision that hastens death may be perceived as an abandonment of loved ones,
rejection or deferral of motherhood confounds the most basic cultural assumptions
about women as it shakes the deep-seated expectation that maternal care will be
unqualified, unquestioning, and uncompromised by competing interests.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S EAR FOR WOMEN'S DECISIONMAKING
The Supreme Court's right-to-die jurisprudence does not provide an adequate
basis for testing the hypothesis that gender can affect the conceptualization of
patients in right-to-die cases. It does, however, provide some evidence of a

37. We set aside, for purposes of this analysis, the important, but derivative questions concerning the
involvement of parents, fathers, and other private parties in abortion decision making.
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correlation between conceptualizing the patient as one in the grip of a complex and
profound decision and recognizing the constitutional significance of failing to honor
the patient's choice. The Court's first significant right-to-die case involved a young
woman, Nancy Beth Cruzan, who was living in a persistent vegetative state at the
time of the Court's deliberations and decision. 38 The Court held that state-imposed
limits on recognition of surrogate choice by an incompetent patient were drawn with
sufficient care to fulfill any state obligation to respect patient choice.39
Subsequently, the Court addressed the constitutionality of state laws prohibiting
assisted suicide; it upheld these laws in a set of cases, each involving three
anonymous patients who died before the cases reached the Court. 40 The Court was
not definitive in these cases as to whether the United States Constitution protects a
suffering patient's right to forego treatment or end his or her life, 4' and in each a
majority rejected the patients' constitutional claims. Nonetheless, some Justices
made clear their view that the Constitution does protect a patient's right of selfdetermination. These Justices, and only these Justices, spoke with particularity about
the decisionmakingprocess faced by gravely ill patients or by their surrogates.
In Cruzan, for example, the opinion of the Court described the patient's
condition, 42 but gave little attention to her state of mind; it simply reported the trial
court's conclusion that the patient had "expressed thoughts at age twenty-five in
somewhat serious conversation with a housemate friend that if sick or injured she
would not wish to continue her life unless she could live at least halfway normally
suggests that given her present condition she would not wish to continue on with her
nutrition and hydration, 43 and summarized the evidence at trial as consisting
"primarily of Nancy Cruzan's statements made to a housemate about a year before
her accident that she would not want to live should she face life as a 'vegetable,' and
other observations to the same effect." 44 By contrast, concurring and dissenting
Justices who indicated more clearly that they would recognize a constitutional right
of patient choice spoke with particularity of the patient's subjective state. Whereas
the majority opinion focused primarily on the patient's right to avoid an unwanted
battery or touching,4 5 Justice Brennan argued that there were "affirmative reasons

38. Cruzan v. Missouri, 497 U.S. 261, 261 (1990).
39. Id. at 292.
40. See Vaco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797 (1997); Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 707 (1997).
41. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 (assuming, without deciding, a liberty interest in freedom from unwanted
medical intervention); Glucksburg, 521 U.S. at 723 (limiting the due process question to "whether the 'liberty'
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to
assistance in doing so").
42. Cruzan, 497U.S. at311 n. 10.
43. Id.
44. Id.at 285.
45. Id. at 270-74.
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why someone like Nancy might choose to forgo artificial nutrition and
hydration . .. .,:46
Dying is personal. And it is profound. For many, the thought of an ignoble
end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent. A quiet, proud death, bodily integrity
intact, is a matter of extreme consequence. "In certain, thankfully rare,
circumstances the burden of maintaining the corporeal existence degrades
the very humanity it was meant to serve. 47
Quoting the opinion of a Maryland court, he probed the state of mind of another
patient contemplating life in a comatose state, noting a concern not only with
invasive medical instruments, but also with "the utter helplessness of the
permanently comatose person, the wasting of a once strong body, and the
'
submission of the most private bodily functions to the attention of others. 48
The
Justice added that these conditions "are, for many, humiliating to contemplate, as
is visiting a prolonged and anguished vigil on one's parents, spouse, and children. 49
Justice Stevens, like Justice Brennan, made clear his belief that the Constitution
protects a patient's right of choice; as he put it, "[o]ur duty, and the concomitant
freedom, to come to terms with the conditions of our own mortality are undoubtedly
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental." And Stevens, like Brennan, saw beyond a right of bodily integrity,
saying, "the constitutional protection for the human body is surely inseparable from
concern for the mind and spirit that dwell therein." 50 The process due in determining
with particularity the wishes Nancy Cruzan would have expressed had she been able
to do so was, for Justice Stevens, a process rooted in an empathetic conception of
the patient's position:
Insofar as Nancy Cruzan has an interest in being remembered for how she
lived rather than how she died, the damage done to those memories by the
prolongation of her death is irreversible. Insofar as Nancy Cruzan has an
interest in the cessation of any pain, the continuation of her pain is
irreversible. Insofar as Nancy Cruzan has an interest in a closure to her life
consistent with her own beliefs rather than those of the Missouri
Legislature, the State's imposition of its contrary view is irreversible. To
deny the importance of these consequences is in effect to deny that Nancy

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
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Id.
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3 10-11 (citation omitted).
311 (quoting In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 953 (Me. 1987)).
343.
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Cruzan has interests at all, and thereby to deny her personhood in the name
of preserving the sanctity of her life.5
Justice O'Connor sounded similar themes in Cruzan. Although she concurred52
in the Court's result and joined in its opinion, she also issued a concurring opinion
in which she expressed a clear view that due process liberty includes a right of selfdetermination for a gravely ill patient and grounded that view in comprehension of
the weight and personal significance of the patient's choice.53 She wrote that
"[r]equiring a competent adult to endure ...[artificial feeding and hydration]

procedures against her will burdens the patient's liberty, dignity, and freedom to
determine the course of her own treatment,, 54 and drew the conclusion that "the
liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects anything,
an individual's deeply personal decision to reject medical treatment, including the
artificial delivery of food and water., 55 Similarly, in Glucksburg and Quill, she
concurred specially to contextualize the decisions involved and to reaffirm the
importance of the rights at issue. In Glucksburg, she began her opinion with the
perspective of the dying patient: "Death will be different for each of us. For many,
the last days will be spent in physical pain and perhaps the despair that accompanies
physical deterioration and a loss of control of basic bodily and mental functions.
Some will seek medication to alleviate that pain and other symptoms. 56 The Justice
then integrated the inductive, contextual process of elaborating the interests that
were and were not at stake in the cases before her with a precise analysis of the rule
to be extracted from the Court's holding. She took pains to distinguish the situations
at bar, in which palliative care was available regardless of whether it would hasten
death, from situations in which the Court might legitimately hold that a
constitutional right had been violated because options available to the patient were
unjustifiably constrained.57
Justice O'Connor has seemed to have a sensitive ear for individuals facing
complex moments of personal choice in situations other than right-to-die cases. In
Troxel v. Granville,58 she wrote for a court faced with the always difficult
responsibility of bringing law to bear in the domestic sphere to reconcile rights of
parental choice and a state's obligation to promote the best interests of children. At
issue was the constitutionality of a Washington statute providing that any person

51.

Id.at353.

52.

Cruzan,497 U.S. at 287. See NANCY MAVEETY, JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: STRATEGISTONTHE

SUPREME COURT (1996), for athoughtful, thorough analysis of Justice O'Connor's strategic use of concurring and
dissenting opinions to draw consensus around positions that reconcile competing principles.
53. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. at 736.
57. Id. at 736-38.
58. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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might at any time and for any reason petition for visitation with a child and that the
petition would be granted if the presiding judge thought the visitation would serve
the child's best interests.5 9 The parties before the Court were Jenifer and Gary
Troxel, the grandparents of two children of their deceased son, and Tommie
Granville, the mother who bore and had always provided primary care for the
children. 6° The grandparents had complained to a Washington court that their
visitation with the children was inadequate and won the right to have it increased.6'
Granville argued on appeal that the Washington court's order was an unjustified
intrusion into her family life that violated her due process rights to make family
decisions and exercise childrearing authority so long as her children were not at risk
of harm. Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority and held that application of the
statute in Granville's case unconstitutionally interfered with her right to rear her
children as she saw fit.62 The Justice acknowledged the Due Process principle that
parents hold a "fundamental right . . . to make decisions concerning the care,

custody, and control of their children, 63 and the presumption "that fit parents act in
the best interests of their children."'64 Sensitive to the competing principle that states
have authority to safeguard the welfare of children, she proceeded to consider
whether the Troxel's visitation order was justifiable. Speaking consistently of the
mother as a decision -maker,65 O'Connor focused on the particulars of the dispute
before her.66 She observed that the mother's fitness was unquestioned and that the
trial judge had overturned the mother's judgment without finding-or being
required to find-that it was unreasonable.6 7 O'Connor concluded that the basis of
the visitation order was nothing more than a disagreement between the state and the
mother as to how the children's best interests would be served.68 Accordingly, she
ruled that the Washington trial judge's decision to second guess and overrule
Granville's judgment concerning the manner and terms under which her children
59. The statute provided that "any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time," and the
court may grant such visitation rights whenever "visitation may serve the best interest of the child." Id. at 61.
60. Id. at 57.
61. The "dispute originated when Granville informed the Troxels that she would prefer to restrict their
visitation with Isabelle and Natalie to one short visit per month and special holidays.... Granville did not oppose
visitation but instead asked that the duration of any visitation order be shorter than that requested by the Troxels.
While the Troxels requested two weekends per month and two full weeks in the summer, Granville asked the
Superior Court to order only one day of visitation per month (with no overnight stay) and participation in the
Granville family's holiday celebrations." Id. at 71 (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 67.
63. Id. at 72.
64. Id. at 68.
65. Id. at 69-70 (observing that the state "failed to provide any protection for Granville's fundamental
constitutional right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her own daughters"); id. at 72 (declaring "an
unconstitutional infringement on Granville's fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of her two daughters").
66. See id. at 68-73.
67. Id. at 68-70.
68. Id. at 72 ("[T]his case involves nothing more than a simple disagreement between the Washington
Superior Court and Granville concerning her children's best interests.").
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should visit their grandparents amounted to "an unconstitutional infringement on
Granville's fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of her two daughters."'6 9
We are struck by the respectful attention Justice O'Connor gave to parental
decision making in Granville. Valuing Granville's decisional autonomy required an
immunity or resistance to cultural pressures to demean domestic governance and to
disregard women's decision making. We sense that O'Connor has understood, from
the perspective of the right-holder, the seriousness and difficulty of parental decision
making and the sense in which state intervention can thwart good parenting and blur
lines of parental authority. We see a similar understanding in her opinions
concerning patients' decisions about the quality of their lives and the manner of their
deaths. We suspect that the capacity for this kind of understanding supported her
recognition of the core constitutional issue in Roe and that it will serve her in the
inevitably difficult cases in which the Court will elaborate its definition of what
counts as an undue-and hence unconstitutional-burden on the right of abortion
choice.
A focus on the decision maker in reproductive rights jurisprudence is badly
needed. The opinion of the Court in Roe virtually ignored the pregnant woman's
thought processes. Instead of developing the idea of abortion choice as an aspect of
family autonomy and individual responsibility, it focused heavily on societal
judgments across time about the acceptability of the practice70 and characterized the
abortion decision as a judgment guided or controlled by the pregnant woman's
doctor. Speaking in dissent, Justice White called attention to abortion
decisionmaking, but only to demean it. He saw the issue as involving, at its heart,
"those recurring pregnancies that pose no danger whatsoever to the life or health of
the mother but are, nevertheless, unwanted for any one or more of a variety of
reasons-convenience, family planning, economics, dislike of children, the
embarrassment of illegitimacy, etc."'" Moving from this characterization of the
situations and rationales of pregnant women claiming a right to choose between
abortion and carrying a child to term, he characterized their constitutional argument
as a claim "that for any one of such reasons, or for no reason at all, and without
asserting or claiming any threat to life or health, any woman is entitled to an
abortion at her request if she is able to find a medical advisor willing to undertake
the procedure. 7 2 More egregiously, White twice described abortion choice as a
matter of convenience, accusing the Court of valuing "the convenience of the
pregnant woman more than the continued existence and development of the life or

69. Id. at 72.
70. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129-44 (implementing the Court's determination to assure objective analysis by placing
"emphasis upon, medical and medical-legal history and what that history reveals about man's attitudes toward the
abortion procedure over the centuries").
71. Id. at 221.
72. Id.
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potential life that she carries," and arguing that a statute criminalizing abortion "is
not constitutionally infirm because it denies abortions to those who seek to serve
only their convenience. ' 3
We know, both from life experience and from Gilligan's longitudinal study of
women who have faced unwanted pregnancy, 74 that abortion choice is no more
likely to be a matter of convenience than is the choice to forego life support or the
choice to regulate a child's contact with a grieving grandparent. Women who choose
abortion are not people who have lost sight of the value of potential life. They are
people who must confront the stark reality of impending life and feel intensely the
value and growth of that life. The pregnant woman must then make a decision that
does justice, not only in terms of the value of respecting and affirming life by
carrying and nurturing the unborn child but also in terms of a web of additional
considerations, including a parent's obligation of care, the quality of life for existing
children, the quality of the expected child's life, the needs and strengths of the
prospective father and of extended family, and the mother's own obligations-both
to herself and to others. This characterization of abortion decisionmaking is
supported by the more than seven-hundred letters filed with the Supreme Court in
connection with Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,75 by women who had
terminated pregnancies, both before and after Roe made it possible for most women
(and their doctors) to choose abortion without vulnerability to prosecution. The
following excerpt is illustrative:
In 1964, I was a nineteen-year old wife and mother of an infant daughter.
My daughter, born five weeks premature, had been diagnosed soon after
birth with a congenital heart defect. She would need open-heart surgery as
soon as she was strong enough.
When our little girl was a year old, I became pregnant as a result of a
contraceptive failure. I tried very hard during this time to imagine caring for
a second child. We considered our finances, our emotional resources and
support system. We sadly had to admit that our marriage was already under
incredible strain. It seemed impossible to have another child without doing
irreparable harm to our existing family.
Abortion was not legal. After several weeks of searching, I found
someone who would perform the procedure, but his fee was more than we
could afford. Beginning to feel desperate, I tried several times to abort

73. Id.
74. Gilligan, supra note 10, at 71-72. The study formed the basis of chapters 3-5, consisting of analyses of
interviews with twenty-nine women referred by abortion and pregnancy counseling services. The women were
interviewed twice-while they were in the process of deciding whether or not to abort their pregnancies and at the
end of the following year. Id.
75. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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myself. Before I could do myself any more harm, the doctor, unlicensed in
the U.S., agreed to reduce the fee to whatever we could afford ....
Since that time, my daughter has had two successful heart operations,
graduated from college and is a healthy productive woman. She also has a
sister born in 1977.
I have heard it said that abortion is just a convenience, especially for
middle-class women. I assure you, pregnancy is no mere inconvenience. A
pregnancy consumes a woman's body, energies and resources for nine
months, many times with complications, sometimes at risk to the woman's
life. After pregnancy, there is a child, life's most sacred responsibility, for
eighteen years, for life .... Every woman must have the right to offer her
child the best chance for life that she can. Every woman must have the right
to enter into this life-absorbing responsibility when she decides that she
can.

76

The pregnant woman's decisionmaking process is at the heart of the
constitutional interest that the Fourteenth Amendment, as understood in Casey,
stands to protect in cases concerning abortion regulation. The decision whether to
bear a child or abort a pregnancy is surely one of "the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime." It is just as surely a choice "central to
personal dignity and autonomy"-a choice that may not be made under
"compulsion" if one is to have the "right to define one's own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." The Court cannot
give appropriate effect to the Fourteenth Amendment's mandate to protect the
generalized right of personhood in the reproductive rights context unless it develops
a particularized and respectful appreciation of the perspectives of pregnant women.
Should the Court fail to address and appreciate the perspective of the pregnant
woman or to focus on her as a decision maker, its undue burden test will prove too
feeble to guarantee the full personhood that the Amendment promises.
The Court has not made clear whether its undue burden test addresses only
obstacles to obtaining an abortion once abortion has been chosen or whether it also
addresses obstacles that coerce or undermine a woman's decision whether to have
an abortion.77 Acceptance of the Casey rationale requires that the Court provide
protection of both kinds, for, as Casey's joint opinion recognizes, self-definition and
integrity of personhood are at least as much compromised by coerced
decisionmaking as by acts that frustrate implementation of a decision once it is
76. Brief for the Amici Curiae Women Who Have Had Abortions and Friends of Amici Curiae in Support
of Appellees at 52, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605).
77. The joint opinion in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey said that "a law designed to further the State's interest
in fetal life which imposes an undue burden on the woman's decision before fetal viability" is unconstitutional. 505
U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (emphasis added). Further, an "undue burden is ... shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantialobstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
of a nonviable fetus." Id. (emphasis added).

2001 /A Woman Decides: Justice O'Connorand Due ProcessRights of Choice
made. Appropriate focus onr pregnant women's decisionmaking should help the
Court to understand what would count as an undue burden on the process of choice.
We illustrate the importance of safeguarding against burdens on decisionmaking
by reference to the oft-litigated issue of the constitutionality of "informed consent"
requirements for abortions performed during the first trimester. The Roe framework
that was overturned by Casey established that states could regulate election of first
trimester abortions only for the purpose of furthering their legitimate interest in
protecting the pregnant woman's health. Before Casey the Court had held,
consistently with Roe's trimester framework, that during the first third of pregnancy
states could not insist that pregnant women seeking abortion consider information
designed not to further the State's interest in women's health but to persuade women
to continue their pregnancies. The joint opinion in Casey rejected this approach,
declaring that states should be free throughout pregnancy to regulate abortion by
discouraging it.7 8 Having done so, it readily approved the informed consent
provision before it, 79 although it was "troubled" by, and considered at some length
before ultimately rejecting them, arguments that the State's requirement of a twentyfour hour waiting period between the provision of the state's antiabortion materials
and the performance of an abortion posed "a substantial obstacle to a woman's
choice to terminate her pregnancy., 80 The Justices had little concern that the twentyfour hour waiting period between provision of antiabortion information and
performance of a lawful abortion would have an impermissible effect on the
decision making process that might lead to a choice to terminate or continue a
pregnancy. Indeed, the authors of the joint opinion found reasonable "[t]he idea that
important decisions will be more informed and deliberate if they follow some period
of reflection" after the provision of information offered by the state as an important
"part of the background of the decision.'
The findings of Gilligan's abortion study, read in the context of the analysis of
psycho-social development summarized in Part II of this article, suggest that in this
respect the joint opinion gave too little weight to the character and circumstances of
abortion decision making. We have said that there is a developmental risk that
women and girls will experience, and then have difficulty overcoming, a tendency
to defer rather than assert their judgment. Women in the abortion study who were
able to make a healthy decision were women who were able to decide rather than
defer. Follow-up interviews indicated that women who deferred to the views of
husbands, lovers, or others in deciding either to abort or to continue the pregnancy
had less healthy outcomes, both in terms of emotional recovery and in terms of the
avoidance (for those whose initial pregnancies could have been avoided by the

78. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882-83.
79. See id. at 883 (approving an informed consent measure designed both "to ensure an informed choice"
and to further a state's interest to preserve life by "caus[ing] the woman to choose childbirth over abortion").
80. Id. at 885-86.
81. Id.at885.
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exercise of care) of additional unplanned pregnancies, than women who took
responsibility for their decision. The pull to defer to another's wish that the pregnant
woman abort or have the child reflected the "enormous power of the judgment of
selfishness" in the women's thinking.82 Women inclined to bear the child felt selfish
in the face of opposition from people asserting competing claims on her time and
attention. Women inclined to end the pregnancy felt selfish in the face of opposition
from people asserting an interest in the potential lives they carried. A college student
respondent who had terminated a pregnancy during her senior year overcame the
pull to deference. She attributed her pregnancy to "a lapse of self-control, decisionmaking, and very much stupidity., 83 "What I had done," she said, "was so wrong
that it came to light to me that I was not taking responsibility where I could have,
and I could have gone on like I was, not taking responsibility., 84 As the abortion
decision loomed, she thought "a lot about decisionmaking, and for the first time...
wanted to take control of and responsibility for my own decisions in life. 85 The
result was that she came to see herself as a competent, responsible adult.
If emotional health and responsibility in procreational choices are, as the
abortion study suggests, correlated with choosing decision over deference, then an
informed consent provision of the kind approved in Casey is misguided. The
decision whether to continue or abort a pregnancy involves a clash of competing
responsibilities and principles. As an informant in a study of college women put it,
the complete avoidance of harm is impossible in view of the "tension and conflict"
that life brings.86 A provision that requires consideration of information designed to
encourage deference to the state's unqualified commitment to potential life badly
oversimplifies the problems and responsibilities posed by an unplanned or unhealthy
pregnancy. It encourages deference to the views of the sovereign rather than
acceptance of the responsibility and complexity of the decision that must be made.
Such a provision is doubly perverse, for the state's interest in women's emotional
health cannot be promoted by encouraging deference over complex and responsible
decision making, and the state's long term interest in reducing abortions is disserved
by encouraging deference over agency and adult responsibility.
The perverse qualities of this kind of abortion regulation underscore its libertyinhibiting qualities. Dissenting from Casey's validation of Pennsylvania's informed
consent requirements, Justice Stevens gave attention not just to the general
proposition that important, intimate, and self-defining life-choices must be made
without state coercion but also to the particular circumstance of choosing abortion
or childbirth. He observed that "[a] woman considering abortion faces 'a difficult
choice having serious and personal consequences of major importance to her own
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future-perhaps to the salvation of her own immortal soul.' ' 87 In words that
resonate with Gilligan's findings, he characterized the decision as a "traumatic" yet
"empowering... matter of conscience," and he concluded that liberty
to make this
decision is "an element of basic human dignity., 88 From this perspective, Justice
Stevens observed that whereas the pregnant woman's interest in the fetus she carries
is intensely particular, personal, and moral, the state's interest in fetal life is secular
and general. 89 He argued that the Fourteenth Amendment permits abortion
regulations that seek "to enhance the deliberative quality" of a pregnant woman's
decision making, 9° but bars the state from forcing upon her, in the period
immediately preceding her choice, "materials clearly designed to persuade her to
choose not to undergo the abortion." 91 Speaking specifically of the twenty-four hour
waiting period, and echoing Justice O'Connor's insistence in Troxel that simple
disagreement about constitutionally-protected choice cannot be reason enough for
a state to reverse that choice, he said:
The decision to terminate a pregnancy is profound and difficult. No person
undertakes such a decision lightly-and States may not presume that a
woman has failed to reflect adequately merely because her conclusion
differs from the State's preference. A woman who has, in the privacy of her
thoughts and conscience, weighed the options and made her decision cannot
be forced to reconsider all, simply because the State believes she has come
to the wrong conclusion.92
In the final analysis, we regard Justice O'Connor's reproductive rights jurisprudence
with a mix of respect and anxiety. We respect and celebrate the Justice for her role
in Casey's reaffirmation of the human right to self-definition. We applaud her
recognition, in cases like Cruzan, Quill and Troxel, of both men's and women's
need of agency. Still, we are sobered by Casey's approval of abortion regulations
that encourage women to defer to a sovereign's global preference rather than face
the excruciating choice that a particular unplanned or unhealthy pregnancy presents.
And evidence of gender bias in courts' appraisals of the human need for agency and
choice leads us to urge for heightened vigilance lest the freedom to choose be
differently respected when it is a woman who decides.

87. Casey, 505 U.S. at 916.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 914.
90. Id. at 916.
91. Id. at 917.
92. Id. at 919.

